The precise subject matter of the legal stand-off between international tech giant Apple and the UK Home Secretary, currently before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (``IPT") in London, is unknown. Apple is forbidden from disclosing it, the Home Secretary refuses to disclose it and, when hearing cases, the IPT itself must ensure information is not disclosed which could jeopardise national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, the UK's economic well-being or the ongoing work of the intelligence services. From a media leak in February and a preliminary IPT ruling in April disclosing the barest of case details, we know only that Apple is challenging the Home Secretary's decision to impose a Technical Capability Notice ("TCN") requiring it to maintain the capability to remove end-to-end encryption ("E2EE") from its iCloud storage. It is Kafkaesque that something about which so little is known has caused Apple to pull its Advanced Data Protection encryption entirely from the UK, provoked a US/UK diplomatic spat,2https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/trump-criticizes-uk-demand-for-apple-user-data-calls-it-something-you-hear-about-with-china/ and called into question the UK's European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") compliance. In fact, the dispute is the latest manifestation of a decades-long tussle over the merits of encryption, pitting against each other the competing priorities of security and privacy. That the dispute continues to generate such fierce argument is a sign not only of the intractability of the debate but also of the failure of the protagonists to level with the public about the trade-offs involved, over many years.